The federal open market committee in 1977 by Richard W. Lang
I HE policy objectives of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) in 1977, as repeatedly expressed
in the domestic policy directive to the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York, were “to foster bank reserve
and other financial conditions that will encourage con-
tinued economic expansion and help resist inflationary
pressures, wlnle contributing to a sustainable pattern
of international transactions.”1 By lowering their long-
run ranges for growth of the monetary aggregates,
the Committee also intended to move gradually to-
ward longer-run rates of monetary expansion con-
sistent with general price stability,2
The desire of the FOMC to reduce gradually the
growth of the monetary aggregates to rates con-
sistent with general price stability was also expected
to help “re-establish a foundation for economic
stability over the longer term.”3 Elaborations of this
position are found in Chairman Burns’ quarterly re-
ports of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System to Congress. Chairman Burns noted in
February of last year that “a healthy and prosperous
economy can be achieved only by pursuing policies
that are consistent with steady progress toward resto-
ration of general price stability.”1 I-Ic went on to note
that “substantial further reduction in growth rates of
all the major monetary aggregates will be needed
over the next few years if our Nation is to succeed in
halting inflation.”5
Chairman Burns did not anticipate that moving
toward rates of monetary expansion consistent with
price stability could come rapidly or without diffi-
culty. But he observed in May that failure to adhere
Note: Unless otherwise stated, citations throughout this paper
are from cither the “Record of Policy Actions of the Federal
Open Market Committee” or “Statements to Congress,” Fed-
eral Reserve Bulletin (February 1977-February 1978),
1”Record” (July 1977), p. 665. Also see “Records” of March
1977 through February 1978,
2”Record” (March, June, September, December 1977), pp 256,
570, 831, 1069, respectively.
3
”Record” (March 1977), p. 256.
~‘Statements” (February 1977), p. 122.
5lbid., p. 124.
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to policies aimed at bringing about noninflationary
economic growth would reduce the chances of sus-
taining the recovery and reducing unemployment.
In concluding this morning, I am obliged to ob-
serve that we have still a considerable distance to go
in potting our financial house in order. Too often in
the past, we have lacked the courage or the patience
to stay long enough on a monetary and fiscal path
that will lend to noninflationary economic growth.
We cannot afford to backslide once again. Unless we
achieve a less inflationary environment, there will be
little chance of sustaining the expansion that is now
in progress or of significantly reducing the high level
of unemployment that is blighting the lives of mil-
lions of Americans. That, in a sentence, is the Board’s
central message to the Congress.~~
As to how much of a reduction in money growth
would be required to achieve general price stability
over the next few years, Chairman Burns indicated
that money growth would have to he less than the
long~rnngrowth rate of total output.
The long-run growth rate of physical production at
full employment has declined in recent years and is
probably around 3½per cent at present. Judging by
the experience of the past two or three decades, a
stable price level would require a rate of expansion
in M-1 that over the long run is well below the
growth rate of total output.7
Thus, Chairman Burns envisioned in February 1977
that over a span of a few years the FOMC would
have to reduce the growth rate of Ml from about 5½
percent in 1976 (from fourth quarter 1975 to fourth
quarter 1976) to a rate of less than 3½ percent.
In 1977, however, no progress was made towards
achieving the FOMC’s long-run objective of a reduc-
tion in the growth of Ml. Instead Ml growth acceler-
ated to a 7.4 percent rate in 1977 (from fourth quarter
1976 to fourth quarter 1977). To understand how
money stock growth could vary to such an extent
from the FOMC’s intended objectives, one must con-
sider the other factors which the FOMC took into
account in its shorter-run policy decisions. Further-
6”Statements” (May 1977), p. 468
~“Statements” (February 1977), p. 124.
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more, strong growth of credit in 1977 along with un-
certainties about the relationship of money growth to
economic activity affected the short-inn implementa-
Hon of the FOMC’s operating objectives.
This article reviews the decisions of the FOMC in
1977. Table I summarizes the FOMC’s economic
policy directives in 1977, and a Supplement at the
end of the article presents a more detailed meeting-
by-meeting summary of FOMC discussions and
decisions,
FOMC OPERATING TARGETS IN 1977
For the third consecutive year, the FOMC in 1977
publicly announced longer-run ranges for the major
monetary aggregates, Ml, M2, and M3. This policy
was begun in early 1975 at the request of Congress as
expressed in House Concurrent Resolution 133, which
was passed on March 24, 1975. The substance of this
resolution was made law in November of last year
with the passage of the Federal Reserve Reform Act
of 1977. This Act requires that the l3oard of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System consult with Commit-
tees of the Congress on a quarterly basis with respect
to its objectives and plans for the ranges of growth of
the monetary aggregates over the next twelve months,
During 1977 Chairman Burns met with Congres-
sional Committees at roughly 90-day intervals to
present the intended ranges of growth of tile mone-
tary aggregates that the FOMC decided upon at its
most recent meeting. These yearly ranges are based
on the quarterly average for the most recent qnarter
to the quarterly average for one year in the future
(see Chart I). The FOMC has repeatedly empha-
sized that targets of this nature are “subject to review
and modification at subsequent meetings” and that
“short-run factors might cause growth rates from
month to month to fall outside the ranges contem-
plated for the year ahead,”8
The month-to-month flexibility in the growth of the
monetary aggregates is reflected in the shorter-run
ranges which are set by the FOMC. These short-run
ranges are specified over moving two-month periods.
For example, the FOMC at its January meeting speci-
fies short-run ranges For the monetary aggregates for
the two-month January-February period.9 Then at the
February meeting the FOMC sets new ranges for the
February-March period. These two-month ranges,
5”Record” (March 1977), pp. 256-57,
°Siace the FOMC meets in snid—mr,nth, these 2—mantIs ranges
are actually set whess a quarter of the 2—month period is over,
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along with the longer-run ranges, are shown in
Table 1. All of the two-month ranges for both Ml and
M2 in 1977 were wider than the longer-run ranges an-
nounced by the FOMC.
Longer-Run Ranges
The FOMC began 1977 with longer-run growth
ranges of 4½to 6½percent for Ml, 7½to 10 per-
cent for M2, and 9 to 11½percent for M3. These
ranges, which had been announced in November
1976, covered the period from third quarter 1976 to
third quarter 1977. The FOMC reviewed these
longer-run ranges at its January meeting and decided
to reduce the lower limits of the M2and M3 ranges
by ½of a percentage point while leaving tile Ml
range unchanged, When Chairman Burns announced
the new M2 and M3 ranges in February 1977, he
stated that tile downward adjustment of the ranges
“largely reflects technical considerations” concerning
the shifting of existing stocks of financial assets among
market securities and time and savings deposits.’° In
addition, he went on to state that:
Besides these technical considerations, the adjust—
sIlent of the lower limit of the projected ranges for
M-2 and M-3 reflects the Federal Reserve’s firsts
intention to continue moving gradually toward rates
of monetary expansion that over the longer run are
consistent with general price stability. -
The projected range for lot-i in the year ahead
reflects our assinnption that the financial innovations
now in train will continue to reduce materially the
propos-tion of transactions balances that al-c held in
the form of currency and demand depositsJ~
At the January meeting at which the above ranges
were set, the Committee agreed that tile outlook for
economic activity had improved after the “pause” in
the fourth quarter of 1976. But there was still concern
expressed about the current high rates of unemploy-
ment and inflation, as well as the possible effects of
the severe winter weather and the new Administra-
tion’s proposed fiscal package.’2
By the lime of the April meeting when the longer-
run ranges were again reviewed, the Administration’s
fiscal program had been substantially changed. The
economic outlook had proceeded to improve during
the first quarter, although there still remained some
uncertainties about the impacts of proposed Adminis-
‘°“State,nents” (February 1977), pp. 123-24.
ilIbid., p. 124.
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tration policies — notably the energy program — and
there was still concern about possible increases in
inflation during the year.18
At the April meeting there was general agreement
that the longer-run ranges should be reduced, but
that only small reductions could be made at this lime.
members 0f the Committee were almost unani-
mous in believing that a reduction of some kind
would be appropriate at this time as another step
toward the ultimate objective of achieving longer-
run rates of monetary expansion consistent with gen-
eral price stability. However, opinions differed as to
the specific reduction to be made.
Partly because of the uncertainties associated with
the energy program, there was little sentiment for
making more than small reductions in the longer-run
ranges at this time.’4
The Committee decided in April to reduce the upper
limits of the M2 and M3 ranges by ½of a percentage
point — changing the ranges to 7 to 9½ percent and
81/u to 11 percent, respectively — while keeping the
Ml growth range unchanged at 4½to 6½percent.15
In announcing these ranges to Congress on May 3,
1977, Chairman Burns noted:
The trend of growth in monetary aggregates is still
rapid, perhaps mneh too rapid. To be sure, the Fed-
eral Reserve has moved fairly steadily toward lower
manges for monetary expansion during the past 2
years. But that movement has been extremel grad-
ual; indeed, at the current pace it would require
nearly a decade to reach rates of growth that are
consistent with a stable price level.
I must report, moreover, that despite the gradual
reduction of projected growth ranges for the aggre-
gates during the past 2 years, no meaningful reduc-
tion has as yet occurred in actual growth rates.16
[Emphasis added.]
The longer-run ranges set in April followed a first
quarter in which N-Il grew at a quarterly average rate
slightly below the lower limit of the long-run range of
4½percent set in January, and M2 was reported to
have grown at a quarterly average rate close to the
midpoint of the long-run range set in January. In con-
trast, the July meeting followed a second quarter in
which Ml grew at a quarterly average rate of about
‘8”Record” (June 1977), pp. 568-69.
‘~Ibidp. 570.
titbid., p. 571. Mr. Partee dissented from this action because
he opposed iTnplementing a downward adiustment at this
particular time, although not opposing it as a long-tersn
obieetive.
le’Statements” (May 1977), p. 467.
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8½percent, well above the longer-run range’s upper
limit of 6½percent set in April. M2 was reported to
have grown in the second quarter at an annual rate
in the upper half of its long-term range.’7 The FOMC
took these second quarter rates of growth of the
monetary aggregates into account when discussing
the longer-run ranges in July.
Moreover, it was observed that the ammual rate of
growth in M~ -lfrElm the first to the second quarter of
1977 had exceeded tile range adopted by the Cons-
mittee at its meeting in April; that despite the grad-
hal reduction of projected ranges of growth for the
aggregates during tile past 2 years, no meaningful
reduction had as yet occurred in actual rates of
growth ,, ~8 [Emphasis added.J
The Committee then decided at this meeting to re-
duce the losver limit of the Mi range by
1
/~of a per-
centage point, while leaving the ranges for M2 and
M3 unchanged.19
Although some members wanted to reduce the
ranges of M2 and M3 or wanted to reduce the upper
hmit of the Ml range as well, the majority of the
FOMC rejected additional changes. It was suggested
that reducing the upper as well as the lower limit of
Ml might “run tile risk of undesirable pressures in
financial markets, a principal effect of which would be
to slow growth in real GNP more than projected.”2°
At the October 1977 meeting, members of the Com-
mittee agreed that the expansion in economic activity
would likely continue for some time. Most members
agreed with staff projections that growth in real GNP
would accelerate in the fourth quarter and would
continue at a moderate pace in 1978, although some
members indicated that uncertainties about the out-
look had increased recently.21
In reviewing the longer-run ranges, consideration
was given to the fact that both Ml and M2 had in-
creased in the third qtiarter at rates above the upper
limits of their longer-run ranges — Ml increased at a
tmt
After data revisions, the first quarter rate of growth of M2
was revised upward to an annual rate of 10.3 percent,
slightly above the upper limit of the range set in January.
The second quarter rate of growth of M2 was also revised
upward — to 9½percent, the upper limit of the range set
in April.
18”Record” (September 1977), p. 831.
‘“Ibid., pp. 832-33 Messrs. Cnldwell, Jackson, and Roos dis-
sented from this action. They favored reducing the upper
limit of Ml, and Messrs. Cohdweli and Jackson also wanted
to reduce the ranges of the broader mnnetary aggregates.
2~Ibid., p. 832.
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9.7 percent rate while M2 increased at a 10.7 percent
rate. The FOMC again sought to make clear its
determination to reduce the ranges of monetary
growth, while at the same time assuring that growth
in the aggregates would be suThcient to facilitate the
expansion of economic activity. But it was also felt
that the FOMC should emphasize that the Commit-
tee’s basic goal was to contribute to the satisfactory
performance of the economy rather than to pursue
predetermined rates of monetary growth. Although
this position is generally implicit at all meetings, it
was felt that it should be emphasized at this meeting
due to various uncertainties regarding recent Ni 1
growth.
Uncertainty was expressed about the underlying
causes of the expansion of the demand for money
(narrowly defined) in the second and third quarters
and about the implications of that expansion for
policy.
Because of the uncertainty about the underlying
causes of the recent expansion in the demand for
M-l and about the prospects for its velocity, some
members indicated that they now had less confi-
dence in the behavior of the monetary aggregates as
guides to monetary policy than they might have had
earlier.22
The Committee decided in October to reduce both
the upper and lower ranges for M2 and M3 by ½ of
a percentage point, while leaving the range for Nil
unchanged.23 This action reduced the N12 and M3
ranges to 6½to 9 percent and 8 to 10½percent,
respectively.
In the fourth quarter of 1977, the quarterly average
growth rate for Ml was still outside the longer-run
range of 4 to 6½ percent; Ml increased at a 7 per-
cent annual rate between the third and fourth quar-
ters. The growth rate of M2 was within its longer-run
range, however; M2 increased at a 7.8 percent rate
between the third and fourth quarters. The slowdown
in the growth of net time deposits reduced M2 growth
in late 1977 as market rates of interest approached or
rose above the ceiling rates of interest that could be
legally paid on these types of deposits.24
D2Jbid,, p. 1067-69.
2~
Ibid.,pp. 1070-71. Mr. Wallieh dissented from this action
because he favored widening the Ml range by raising the
upper limit to 7 percent whije lowering the lower limit to
3 percent.
24Net time deposits are defined as: savings deposits, time de-
posits open account plus time certificates of deposit (other
than negotiable time certificates of deposit issued in denom-
inations of $100,000 or more by weekly-reporting large
commercial banks).
Thus, in the last three quarters of 1977 the quarter-
to-quarter growth rates of Ml exceeded the upper
limit of the longer-run ranges set by the FOMC. After
data revisions, M2 growth during the first three quar-
ters of 1977 was at, or exceeded, the upper limits of
the FOMC’s long-run ranges. Although M2 growth in
the fourth quarter slowed substantially due to the rise
in market rates of interest, M2 increased 9.6 percent
from foui-th quarter 1976 to fourth quarter 1977. This
rate of growth was near the upper end of the long-
term range set at the beginning of 1977 (see Table I),
but was above the upper limit of the long-term range
announced in November.
On balance, the quarter-to-quarter growth rates of
the monetary aggregates in 1977 often exceeded the
rates of growth which the FOMC had established for
the year ahead and which it felt would be consistent
with its long-run objective of gradually reducing the
growth rates of the aggregates. The reasons for this
result involve the shorter-run objectives 0f the FONIC.
As noted earlier, the FOMC has repeatedly stated
that shorter-run factors may lead to monthly money
growth that fails outside the longer-run ranges.25
Shorter-Run Ranges
At each monthly meeting, the FOMC sets short-run
ranges for Ml, M2, and the Federal funds rate that
are thought to be consistent with the longer-run goals
of monetary policy. The shorter-rtnl ranges for the
growth rates of Ml and M2 are stated in terms of
average growth rates over two-month periods, and
are generally wider than the longer-run ranges for
Ml and M2.
The shorter-run objectives for the Federal funds
rate are stated in terms of both a raTlge and a specific
level that is thought to be consistent with the short-run
ranges set for Ml and M2. For example, at the meet-
ing held on April 19, 1977, the FOMC stated that the
growth rates of Ml and M2 were “likely to he associ-
ated with a weekly-average Federal funds rate of
about 4¾per cent. _‘R, However, if tile two-month
gro\vth rates of Ml and M2 appeared to “deviate
significantly from the midpoints of the indicated
ranges, the operational objective for the Federal funds
rate shall be modified in an orderly fashion within a
range of 4½to 5¾per cent.”27
CD”Record” (March, June, September, December 1977), pp.
257, 571, 832, 1071, respectively.
2
RT”Record” (June 1977), p. 574.
2IJbid
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The April domestic policy directive was an “aggre-
gates directive” since it gave greater weight to growth
rates of Ml and M2 than to money market conditions.
Alternatively, the FOMC could have given the Open
Market Desk a “money market directive” which would
have given greater weight to money market condi-
tions than to growth rates of Ml and M2. During 1977
there were four “money market directives” and eigilt
“aggregates directives.”28 The differences between
these two types of directives during 1977 can he snore
readily observed by citing the entire paragraph from
the domestic policy directive which relates to the
short-term operational objectives of the FOMC.
The aggregates directive of tIle April 19, 1977
meeting stated:
The Committee seeks to encourage near-term
rates of growth in M-1 and NI-2 on a path heheved
to he reasonably consistent with the longer-run
ranges for monetary-aggregates cited in the preced-
ing paragraph. Specifically, at present, it expects the
annual growth rates over the April-May period to be
within the ranges of 6 to 10 per cent for NI-i and 8 to
12 per cent for M-2. In the judgment of the Com-
mittee such growth rates are likely to be associated
with a weekly—average Federal funds rate of about
4¾ per cent. If, giving approximately equal weight
to Al-I and M-2, U appears that growth rates over
the 2—month period will deviate significantly from
the midpoints of the indicated ranges, the opera-
tional objective for the Federal funds rate shall be
modified in all orderly fashion within a range of
~½ to 5¼per cent.2” [Emphasis added.]
In contrast, the money market directive of the Octo-
ber 17-18, 1977 meeting stated:
At this time, the Committee seeks to maintain
about the prevailing money market conditions dur-
ing the period inlmediateiv -ahead, provided that
monetary aggregates appear to he growing at ap-
proximately the rates currently expected, which are
believed to be on a path reasonably consistent with
tile longer-run ranges for monetary aggregates cited
in the preceding paragraph. Specifically, the Com-
nlittee seeks to maintain the weekly-average Federal
funds rate at about 6½ per cent, so long as M-1 and
M-2 appear to he growing over the October-Novem-
ber period at annual rates within ranges of 3 to 8 per
cent and 5½to 9½per cent, respectively. If, giving
approximately equal weight to M-I and M-2, it ap-
pears that growth rates over the 2-month period are
approaching or moving beyond the limits of the
indicated ranges, the operational objective for the
28
”Money market directives” ‘vere given to the Desk in June,
October, Novemnber, and December. “Aggregates directives”
were given to the Desk in January, Februamy, March, April,
May, July, August, and September.
29
”Record” (June 1977), p. 574.
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All of the aggregates directives in 1977, except
Januarys, were of tile same general form as the above
April directive, while all of tile money market direc-
tives in 1977 were of the same general form as the
above October directive.3’ In both forms of the direc-
tive, a level of the Federal funds rate is specifically
given as a near-term operating target (see Table I).
Thus, in following an aggregates directive, the Open
Market Desk still uses a Federal funds rate as its
operational objective.
The Open Market Desk’s implementation of the
FOMC’s domestic policy directives in 1977 resulted
in rates of monetary growth that often exceeded the
longer-run target ranges set by the FOMC (Chart I),
and which often exceeded the shorter-run ranges as
well (see Chart II). The Federal funds rate, on the
other hand, svas almost always kept witlnn its shorter-
run ranges during 1977 (see Chart III). This result is
not surprising given that the short-run implementation
a range hut also in terms of a level within a range,
one could expect that the Federal funds rate would
fluctuate less than the monetars- aggregates.
Under a money market directive, the Open Market
Desk in 1977 sought to alter the Federal funds rate ill
response to growth of the monetary aggregates only
if these aggregates grew, or were projected to grow’,
at rates approaching or outside the limits of their
ranges. Since the shorter-run ranges for the aggregates
were wider than the longer-run ranges, and since tile
FOMC in 1977 instructed the Desk to give equal
weight to Ml and N12 in implementing policy, there
could he substantial fluctuations in either Ml or M2
from tile midpoints of their specified ranges without
leading the Desk to cilange its operating target level
for the Federal funds rate.
l0”Record” (December 1977), pp. 1073-74.
3~
TlleJanuary directive bad a less specific format than other
domestic policy directives im~1977. In January the Committee
sought “to achieve bank reserve and money market condi-
turns consistent with moderate growth in monetary aggre-
gates over time period ahead.” See the “Record” (March
1977), p. 259. As was the case in previous years, specific
ranges for the monetary aggregates and Federal funds rate
were given in the “Record of Policy Actions” at the January
meetulg, instead of in the domestic policy directive. In addi-
tion, the Jaauasy “Record” did not specify that the Federal
funds rate should be changed in response to deviations from
the midpoint.s of the monetary growth ranges, as was the
case in other aggregates directives in 1977.
of policy remained, as in previous years,
control of the Federal funds rate. Since the
Federal funds target was set not just in
keyed to
short-run
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FOMC Short-Run Ranges for Monetary Aggregates
FOMC Ranges for Federal Funds Rate
Under an aggregates directive, with the exception
of January’s directive, the Open Market Desk in 1977
sought to alter tile Federal funds i-ate in response to
growth of the monetary aggregates only if these ag-
gregates grew’, or were projected to grow’, at rates
significantly different from the midpoints of their
ranges. However, since the FOMC again instructed
the Desk to give equal weight to Ml and M2 in
implementing policy, there could he substantial fluc-
tuations from tile midpoint of the range of one of tile
aggregates without leading tile Desk to change its
operating target level for the Federal funds rate, pro-
vicled that the other monetary aggregate was growig





The possibility of wide short-run fluctuations in Nil
and M2 was increased further in 1977 by the cautions
approach taken by tile FOMC in interpreting changes
ill these monetary -aggregates. At time January meet-
ing, the Committee took into account tl~efact that
growth of Ml ill 1976 llad ileell significantly slower
than expected due to the spread of various financial
innovations that reduced the ptiblic’s demand for de-
mand deposits for transactions purposes. In contrast,
growtll of the broader money measures (M2 and M3)
had been more rapid than expected in 1976. Several
members of the Committee suggested that these ad-
justments to financial innovations were expected to
have less impact in 1977, so that M2 and M3 were
expected to grosv at somewhat slolver rates in 1977
than they did in 1976.32
Since the duration of the effects of tllese financial
innovations could only be very roughly foreseen, the
FOMC at tIle beginning of 1977 was faced with some
uncertainty as to what extent future ei~anges in the
pattern of growth (If tile aggregates would he ~nflu—
eneed by these innos-ations. This tended to lead the
FOMC to react cautiously- to changes in money
growtll. However, members of the FOMC reacted
cantiouslv to cilanges in money growth for a number
of other reasons as well, as can he seen by examining
the Committee’s discussions at various meetings.
For example, at tile March meeting it was ohserved
that increased economic activity over the weeks ailead
would tend to isles-ease the “demands for transactions
balances and thereby tend to increase the growtll
rates of the n,onetas-v aggregates.” At the April meet-
ing. the Comnmittee decided it w’ould he willing to
tolerate two—n,onth ranges for n,onetarv growth that
were higher than the longer-nm ranges determnined at
this mneeting (see Table I) “because of tile expectation
that the forces contributing to rapid expansion in M-1
‘‘‘‘llt’eL’rCF’ ( MareS 1977 ), pp. 25-5—56, and “Staienseuts” ( Fel,—
ruarv 1977). pp. 123-24.
““Record” (May 1977), P 481.
‘vi
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in early April would prove to he transitory and that
the bulge in growth for the month as a whole w’ould
for the most part be offset by slower growth later
on.”34
At this meeting there was also discussion of
uncertainties associated with the energy program.
which some members of the Committee felt limited
reductions in the longer-run growth ranges.:ls
At the May meeting the Committee reduced their
two-month ranges for Nfl and M2, as they took ac-
count of a staff study which suggested that the large
increase in Ml in April “raised the money stock suth-
eiently to accommodate much of the public’s need for
additional transactions balances in the second quarter
and, consequently, that monetary growth was likely
to be slow.”36 The conclusions of this study were also
taken into account in setting the two-month grow’th
ranges at the June meeting. However, a staff study
indicated that demand deposits were likely to be in-
creased snore than usual in July as a result of the
early distribution of social security cheeks. Due in
part to the uncertainty which this technical factor
introduced into the growth of money during July, the
FOMC adopted a money market directive for the
first time in 1977,’~
The FOMC returned to an aggregates directive at
the July meeting after money growth was moderate
in June. Although money growth was very rapid in
July, data on Ml and M2 that became available after
the July meeting were considered to be very tentative
because of unusual patterns in the data received just
after the power failure in New York City. In addition.
the Comnmittee at its August meeting expected money
growth to slow in August and September. Conse-
quently, an aggregates directive was mamtanled and
the two-month ranges for money growth were low-
ered (see Table I).
However, at the September meeting it was noted
that money growth had not slowed in August as much
as was expected at the August meeting and that
money growth was also expected to increase in Sep-
tember. Some members of the Con,rnittee thought
that the recent higher growth in Ml reflected the end
of the effects of earlier financial innovations. Thus,
they thought the demand for money may have in-
creased, returning to a more “typical” relationship
between money and CNP.35 There was considerable
‘~“Record”(June 1977), p. 572.
“Ibid., p. 570,
~°“Record” (July 1977), p. 663.
‘~“Reeord”(August 1977), pp. 736-37.
~~“Record” (November 1977), pp. 1002-3.
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disagreement among Committee members as to the
appropriate ranges for the monetary aggregates and
Federal funds rate at this meeting. The Committee
decided on an aggregates directive with a higher
range for Ml growth than that adopted at the August
meeting (see Table I), but there were four dissenting
votes. Messrs. lily and \Valheh dissented because
they felt the directive allowed more firming in money
market conditions than was appropriate at the time,
while Messrs. Morris and Boos dissented because the)’
felt the directive was all inadequate response to re-
cent rapid growth of the monetary aggregates.39
At the October meeting, the growth rates for Ml
and M2 were expected to increase at or above the
upper limits of their September-October ranges. Un-
eertamty was expressed at this meeting as to “the
underlpng causes of the expansion of the demand for
money (narrowly defined) in the second and third
quarters 40
It was suggested tlsat various changes in financial
technology that had been resulting in substitution
of income-earning deposits for demand deposits had
become less powerful and, eonsequentiv, that in-
creasing demands for transactions balances in the
latest two quarters had had a greater effect on
growtll in Ni-i.”
Because of uncertainty about the causes of recent
rapid Nil growth, some members “had less confidence
in the behavior of tile monetary aggregates as guides
to monetary policy” and thought that it was “impor-
tant to emphasize that tile Committee’s basic goal
was to contribute to the satisfactory performance of
the economy rather than to pursue pre-determined
rates of monetary growth.”~2Against this background
of uncertainty, the FOMC decided on a money mar-
ket directive and raised the two-month ranges for
Nil and M2 growth.43
Money market directives were also decided upon
at the November and December meetings, while
growth of the monetary aggregates slowed down dur-
ing the last two months of the year. In November the
Committee favored maintaining stable Condlitions in
the money market and were willing to accept a wider
pp. 1005-6.
40
”Reeord” (December 1977), pp. 1063 and 1068.
“Ibid., p. 1068.
12Ibid. p. 1069.
“Ibid., p. 1072, Mr. Morris dissented frons this actioss because
he preferred that the Committee take “mole aggressive action
to eurhl excessive growth in the nsonetamy aggregates. ,
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growth range for Ml which included relatively low
growth. Slower growth of the aggregates in the last
two months of the year was acceptable to tbe Coin-
mittee in view of their earlier rapid rates of growth.
At the December meeting the Committee again fa-
vored maintaining stable money market conditions.
Taking account of the performance of the economy.
the slowing in the growth of the aggregates. and
uncertainties in financial markets associated with the
end of the year, the FOMC did not feel that increases
in short-term interest rates were warranted. On the
other hand, with the decline in the value of the dol-
lar on foreign exchange markets, the FOMC did not
feel that decreases in short-term rates were warranted
either.44
The uncertainties about the monetary aggregates
expressed at the monthly meetings reflect various
cases of more general uncertainties. In presenting the
quarterly report of the Board of Governors to Con-
gress, Chairman Burns stated on February 3, 1977:
I must note, however, as I have repeatedly in the
past, that profound uncertainties surround the rela-
tionships among the various monetary aggregates
and between rates of monetary expansion and eco-
nomic performance.45
Furthermore, in the quarterly report presented to
Congress on May 3, 1977, Chairman Burns discussed
one of the reasons why monetary growth objectives
are difficult to achieve. After noting that tlsere had
been no meaningful reduction in actual rates of
money growth over the past two years despite reduc-
tions in the FOMC’s longer-run ranges, he stated:
That unintended consequence is part1~-the result of
data deficiencies that complicate the already formi-
dable task of adjusting or approximating monetary
growth objectives. Initial estimates of the monetary
aggregates sometimes differ considerably from esti-
mates made later when fuller data became available.
A factor contributing to the measurement problesn
has been the inadequacy of deposit data for non-
member commercial banks.” [Emphasis’ added.]
Mr. J. Charles Partee, a member of the Board of
Governors, presented the views of the Board of Gov-
44”Record” (January, February 1978), pp. 23, 106.
~“Statemeats” (February 1977), p. 124.
~“Statements” (May 1977), p. 467. The problem of data de-
ficiencies mentioned by Chairman Burns became more diffi-
cult as 1977 progressed. Benchmark revisions based on 1977
Call Report data from nonmcmber banks were not made,
Due to a reporting problem, no quarterly Call Reports from




ernors to Congress on September 27, 1977, concerning
the rapid rates of monetary growth between February
and August. In his statement to Congress, he dis-
cussed sources of uncertainty in controlling the mone-
tary aggregates.
Some would argue that the Federal Reserve
should have responded more forcefully to the April
and July bulges in the money supply. Irdeed, a few
would say that the ,‘eserves necessary to support the
deposit expansion simply should not have been pro-
vided, letting financial markets-and the economy
suffer whatever consequences might result. But the
FOMC continues to believe that the wiser course is
to limit the speed with which money market condi-
tions’ are adjusted to changing monetary growth
rates. We believe this partly because the monetary
aggregr-iteu — particularly M-1 — have proved to he
inherently unstable in the short run. Bulges of a
month or two in duration are often reversed subse-
quentlv, as was the case in the spring and summer
of 1975 and again in 1976. Prudence in our actions is
dictated also by the fact that the relationship be-
tween the various pleasures of monetary growth and
the performance of the economy is loose and urn-c-
liable, since it is subject to rather abrupt slsifts as the
result 0f changing financial pracbces and economic
conditions.4 [Emphasis added.]
Instability in the demand for money is of particular
importance to implementation of the FOMC’s policy
directives to the Open Market Desk, since in the
short run the Desk seeks to accommodate the public’s
demand for money.
The FOMC’s instructions to the Manager of tlse
System Open Market Account regarding the man-
agement of bank reserves provide — to a consider-
able extent — for the accommodation of the public’s
demand for money in the short run, while at the
same time prescribing a response when growth of
money appears inconsistent with the Committee’s
long—term objectives.48
If the public’s demand for money is unstable in the
short run, a point on which economists disagree,
accommodating these shifts by holding short-term
interest rates constant requires frequent changes in
the supply of bank reserves. As a result, money
fluctuate considerably from gro’cvth rates could
month-to-month.
~~“Statemeats” (October 1977), p. 890.
~~“The Insplcmentatioa of Monetary Policy in 1976,” Federal
Reserve Bulletin (April 1977), p. 326. This article was
adapted from a report subnsittcd to the FOMC by Alan R.
Flohncs and Peter D. Sternlight. Manager and Deputy Man-
ager of the System Open Market Account, respectively. John
S. Hill and Christopher J. McCurdy were primarily respon-
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CREDIT AND MONEY GROWTH
Month—to-mouth fluctuations in money growth can
also be related to changes in the demand for credit.
In his quarterly report of the Board of Governors to
Congress on November 9. 1977, Chairman Bums dlis-
cussed the growth of credit during 1977 as an addi-
tional reason for the rapid growth of money,
There is no i’igid link between the total volume of
credit outstanding in the economy and! the Nation’s
stock of money. but movements in credit and money
d0 tend. 0f course, to be positivcl~ related. If the
dlemandl for credit begins to strengthen at a time
when financial mstitutions are relatively 1i~pid, a
good amount 0f credlit expansiors can 0cc’ Sr without
much — if any — change in monetary balances. But
as the economy grows and credlit expansion con-
tinues, sooner or later a needl for enlarged1 money
balances will arise in order to facilitate the enlargedl
total of credit transactions. Such a process has un-
questionably been at work this year. and it explains
in some measure why the growth of M—l — the
narrow money stock — has acceleratedl recently in
relation to ninue\- growth earlier in this expansion:’5
At almost every FOMC meeting in 1977. data on the
expansion of bank credlit was reported as being strong
(see Supplement).
l’o the extent that the short—term operating target
of the Federal Reserve is keyed to stabilizing the
Federal funds rate, increases in the demand for credit
which put upward pressure on this interest rate will
tend to he accomnsodatcd by the Open Market Desk.
Thus, increased crerlit demand!s may be accommo-
dlated just as an increase in the demandl for money’ is
accommodated by the Open Market Desk. ,As pointed
out in the abnye quotation by Chairman Burns. such
an accommodation of increasedl credit demands ap-
parently occurred in 1977.
Since an increase in the dlemanol hr money and an
increase in the dlemandl for credit can both be sources
of upward pressure on the Fetleral fundls rate, it may
be difficult in practice for the Federal Reserve to
distinguish between the two. Thus, by stabilizing the
Federal funds rate through changes in bank reserves,
the Federal Reserve may accommodate an increase in
the demand for credit, with the result that the money
stock rises.
MONETARY POLICY IN 1977
TIGHT OR EASY?
If the tightness or easiness of monetary policy is
dlefined solely in terms of the changes in interest
““Statements” ( November 1977), p. 990.
rates, then monetary policy in 1971 was “tight” be-
cause interest rates increased! during the ~‘ear. On the
other handl, if the tightness or easiness of monetary
policy is dlefinedl in terms of the behavior of bank re-
serves or the money stock (Ml). then monetary policy
in 1977 was “easy” because these reserve or monetary
aggregate measures increased more s’apidly in 1977
than they did in 1976.
General descriptions of monetary policy — sucb as
“tight, ‘easy, or “moderate’ — rarely appear in the
monthly “Record! of Policy Actions of the FOMC,”
However, in the “Record” for the September 20, 1977
meeting it is mentioned! that most FOMC members
favoredl finding some “middle groundl in tenns of a
policy response to rapid growth in Ml and M2.5° In
dhscussing FOMC actions in the first ten months of
1977, Chairman Burns in November also dlescrihed
monetary policy as taking a “middle course.”
Under the circumstances, we have ~udged it wise
to mo”e cautiously in adapting policy e well
realize tlsat the middle course actually followed —
that of gradually limiting the availability of hank re-
serves and thereby slowing the growth of money —
has left us open to the charge of temporizing. In
fact, ‘ye (lid not temporize at all, hut we did move
prudlentlv.
On the one band, restrictive action vigorous
enougis to have kept M— I growth within the pro—
jected ranges wnm Id. we believe, have forced a far
steeper d-lnnb in shnrt—tenn intes-est rates than actu-
ally has occurred since April. This couldl has-c
proved destructn-e to the smooth functioning of
financial uarkets audi might eventually liiive brought
serious injury to) our ed’onomv.
On the other hand, a determined effort by the
Federal Resers-e System to prevent any rise in inter-
est rates (luring recent months would have produced
— in the face of the credit pressures that have been
experienced — a rate of monetary expansion ‘veil
ahos-e the rise that has actually occurred. That would
have been s-cry damaging, for it wouldl have prac-
tically destroed any remaining hope of achiex-ing
mastery over the inflationary forces that now uiose
0! Sr society,
By taking measures to dumb the growth 0f mone. we
have diemonstratedl that we remain alert to the dan-
gers of inflation. As a consedlueuce, long—term inter-
est rates, which nowadays are extremely sensitive to
expectations of inflation, have remained substan-
tially stable.51
Thus, Chairman Bums felt that in 1977 the Federal
Reserve moderated increases both in interest rates and
iSO”Record” (November 1977), p. 1003.
aiStatcinents’ (November 1977), pp. 991-92.
Page 13This supplement consists of selected excerpts from
the “Record of Policy Actions” for each of the FOMC
meetings in 1977. Each “Record” includes analyses of
current and projected economic developments, dis-
cussions of current policy actions, and long- and short-
run operating instructions issued by the FOMC to the
Trading Desk. The full text of each “Record of Policy
Actions” appears in issues of the Federal Reserve
Bulletin,
Meeting held on January 17-18, 1977
Over most of the inter-meeting period incoming
data suggested that the aggregates were growing at
about the expected rates, and the Manager of the
System Open Market Account conducted operations
with a view to maintaining the Federal funds rate
close to 4% per cent — the level prevailing at the
time of the December meeting. Near the end of the
inter-meeting pes-iod, incoming data began to) sug-
gest that over the December-January period growth
in M-1 would be snmewhat above the range that had
been specifleol by the Connnittee but that growth in
M-2 would he near the midpoint of its range. With
the Committee scheduled to meet in a few days, the
Manager continued to) aim for a Federal funds s-ate
of about 4% per cent, although with a little greater
willingness to tolerate small deviations above that
rate than below it.
In the discussion of the ecorsomic situation at this
meeting, members of the Committee agreed that the
outlook for growth in real output of goods and sen’—
ices had strengthened It was also observed,
however, that even if growth in real GNP during
1977 were siguificantlv greater than projected by the
staff, rates of resource use iss the fourtis d4uarter of
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the year still would not appear to he excessive;
indeed, unemployment would still be relatively high.
Although Committee members in general now
held a more favorable view of the economic situa-
tion and outlook than they had a month or two ago,
attention \vas called to) a number of problems. For
one, the severity of the winter weather and its im-
pact on the availability of fuels for mdlustrial use
posed a threat to output and employment in some
parts of the country. Even though the unemployment
rate was still unacceptably lugh, current and pro-
spective rates ef inflatims also remained a source of
major concern.
A measure of concern was also provoked by cer-
tain aspects of the Feoleral huolget. after incorpora-
tion of assumptions about the new adiministrations
fiscal proposals.
It appeared likely that over-all dlemands for funds
in securities markets would continue to) lie sizable
during the months just ahead,
most members preferred to have operating
decisions in the period ahead based primarily on the
behavior of the nsonetarv aggregates.
Meeting Held on February 15, 1977
Throughout the inter—meeting period iucomning data
suggested that growth in both M— 1 and M—2 over the
January—February pcriool woinld he well within the
ranges that bad been specified by the Cojnn,ittee.
Accordingly, the Manager d-ontmnerl to) dln’ect op-
erations toward maintaining the Federal funds rate
in the-area 0f 4% to 4% per cent.
In tlseir discussion of recent economic develop-
ments and prospects, members of the Cmnmittee
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iii money growth, and at the same time avoided in- tant factors affecting the implementation of the
creases in inflationary expectations. FOMC’s short-nm operating objectives.
One of the FOMC’s long-run objectives in 1977
was to reduce gradually the growth of the mone-
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS tam-v aggregates over time to rates consistent with
general price stability. During the year the FOMC
The Federal funds rate was generally within the reduced its longer-run ranges for growth of the mone-
FOMC’s short-nm ranges during 1977. Growth of Ml tary aggregates in pursuit of this policy. However,
and M2, on the other hand, frequently exceedeol the due to the rapid growth of Ml and M2 during the
FOMC’s shorter-run ranges. Strong growth of credit in second and third quarters of the year, actual growth
1977 and uncertainties about the relationship of rates of the monetary aggregates were not consistent
money growth to economic activity were both inipor- with the FOMC’s longer-run objectives.
SUPPLEMENT
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agreed that the underlying situation ‘was strong and
that the losses in output, hours of work, and income
resulting from the weather would soon he made imp.
Most members agreed with the staff projections
suggesting that growth in real CNP would accelerate
to a rapid pace in the second quarter — reflecting
not only the recovers’ from the weather-indluced
losses but also the disbursement of tax rebates and
related payments — and then would continue at a
relatively good rate thronghout the secmid half of
the year.
However, one or two members expressed concern
that the weather disturbance and the tax rebates
might cause large swings in business inventory in-
vestment and therefore in total GNP.
Looking to the latter part of 1977 and into) 1978,
some questions were raised about the adequacy of
industrial capacity. .. .Concern was expressed that
the margin of unused plant capacity that cculd be
drawn into production might be low in relation to
the amount of unemployeoi labor. It was also ob-
served that rates of capacity utilization varied con-
siderably among industries and that during business
expansions bottlenecks begin to spread through the
industrial system long before over-all measures of
capacity utilization reach relatively high levels.
It was suggested that the rise in prices might
become more rapid as activity expanded during the
period ahead.
Total credit at U.S. commercial banks increased
considerably in January, following a small rise in
December. Data for both months, however, were
distorted by special influences — particularly a sub-
stantial increase in bank holdings of bankers accept-
ances late in 1976 that was largely reversed in
January.
As to policy for the period immediately ahead,
Committee members in general advocated continua-
tion of about the current stance. They differed little
in their preferences for ranges of growth in the
monetar aggregates over the February-March
period.
Meeting Held on March 15, 1977
Throughont the interval since the February meet-
big, the Manager of the System Open Market Ac-
count had continued to aim fosr a Federal funois rate
in the area of 4% to 4% per cent. In the early weeks
of the inten’al, incoming data had suggested that
growth in both M-I and M-2 over the February-
March period would be close to the midpoints of the
specified ranges. Estimates of the 2-month growth
rates subsequently were revised downivard, but they
remained reasonably well within their specified
ranges.
In the discussion of the economic situation at this
meeting, members of the Committee were in general
agreement with the staff projection that real GNP
would expand at a rapid rate in the second quarter
of 1977 and at a more moderate, hut still rather
substantial, rate in subsequent quarters.
Several members expressed concern about the re-
cent and prospective behavior of prices.
It was observed during the discussion that, given
the longer-run ranges for growth in the monetary
aggregates adopted at the January meeting, the
projected rates of increase in nominal GNP implied
a rise in the income velocity of money that was large
for this stage of a business expansion. In that connec-
tion it was noted that significant upward pressures
on interest rates miglst develop later in the year,
particularly if prices should rise more rapidly than
projected or if inflationary expectations should
strengthen. On the other hand, one member re-
marked that, while interest rates played a role, the
predominant determinant of velocity changes was
the state of confidence. On the basis of Isis judgment
that confidence was improving, he thought it was
likely that the rate of increase in velocity would be
quite high. Another member observed that in almost
every business expansion since \-Vorld War II, the
rate of increase in velocity had reached a primary
peak, then dropped back before reaccelerating to a
secondary peak not quite so high as the first one.
Total credit at U.S. co’inmercial banks rose more in
February than in any other month since the summer
of 1974. Acquisitions of U.S. Treasury securities were
especially large, holdings of other securities rose
somewhat for the first time since Nnvember, anol
total loans continued to expand.
It appeared likely that over-all credit demands
would remain strong in the periool immediately
ahead.
As to policy for the period ismmediately aheaol,
members of the Committee diol not ohffer greatly
in their preferences for ranges of growth for the
monetary aggregates over the March-April period. ft
was suggested that the forces that had contributed
to particularly slow growth in the monetary aggre-
gates in February might he reversed and might con-
tribute to rapid growth in March, and that such a
development should not necessarily cause concern.
It was also observed that the upward momentum of
economic activity in the weeks ahead would tend to)
expand demands for transactions balances and thus
to exert some upward pressure on growth rates for
the monetary aggregates.
Meeting held on April 19, 1977
Over most of the interval between the March and
April meetings, incoming data suggested that the
2-month growth rates for M-l andl M-2 would1 he ‘veil
within their respective ranges. Consequently, the
Manager of the System Open Market Account con-
tinued to aim for a Federal funds rate in the area of
4% to 4% per cent. Near the end of the period,
however, it appeared that growth in M-1 would
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exceed the upper limit of its 2-month range as,d that
growth in M-2 would he is, the upper past of its
range. In those cirm,mstances, the Manager aimed
for a Federal funds rate of around 4% per cent.
The staff projections for subsequent quarters in-
corporated revised assmnptions for fiscal policy, as
a result of the Presiolent’s announcement on April 14
of changes irs his package of n,easures designed to
stimulate growth isi economk- activity.
Growtls in meal CNP over the next few quarters
was still projecteoi to, he substautial, refleo:ting
strength in consumer demands and expansion of
husiness inyestn,ent ii, hoth fixed d-apital and inven-
tories. The projections continued to suggest that the
rise in the fixed-weighted price inolex for gsoss busi-
ness product would he less rapidl in the quarters
immediately aheaol than iii tl,e first quarter, when it
bad accehcmated because of the adverse effects of
severe weather. Upwaroh price pressures o\er the
next several quarters were nonetheless expectedl to,
be somev,-hat greater than haol bees, anticipated
earlier, partly because of further deteriamatio,ms in the
outlook for prices of some foodls and partly because
of the prospect of ano,ther increase i,’ the minimum
wage soon after midyear.
Withdrawal of the proposal for tax rebates was
thought to be of co,nsidesah,le significance. Some
members expected that this change. especially in
conjunction with, the n,easures aismed at reducing
inflatio,n, would contribute to improvement in h,sssi—
ness and consumer confidence and is, that way would
add strength to the economic outloo,k.
Attention was drawn toi other potentially tro,uble—
some aspects of the dex’eloping economic sits sation.
Thus, one member con,n,enteoi thsat growth is,
nominal CNP over the o1uarters aheadi at the rate
indicated in tl,e staff proijectio~ns— which did not
take the energy prograu~i,ito account — might well
be accompanied by o-onsiderabhe strain in financial
markets.
Over the first quarter, expansion in to,tai bank credit
was greater tbau i,’ any o,tl,er quarter in 2½years.
For the period immediately ahead, tb,e principal
new factor in the outlook for credit demands was
time prospective sh,fft in the position o,f tb,e U.S.
Treastsrv from a sizable net borro,wer tos a temporary
repayer oif debt At the same tis,,e, how-ever, l,usiness
demands for d-redhit were still expected to expas~das a
,-esult of continuing impro~veme,mtin econon~icad”—
itv. Projectio,us of consus,,er expessohtsss-cs is,iphied a
coutimsed high rate of growth in co,nsnmer credit
outstanding, ai~dexpansion of smortgage debt was
anticipated to remain large. State and local go~-ern-
meat borrowing was-also expected to ren~ainsizable.
As to policy for the period immediately ahead, the
Committee nsemhers wem-e willing to to,lerate growth
in the monetary aggregates over tue April-Mar
period within ranges that were higher than those
adopted for the year ahead because of the expecta-
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tion tb,at the fo,s-ces contributing to rapid expansion
in M-l in early April would prove to he transitory
auol that the bulge i,, gro~wtli fo,r the month as a
wh,ole wouhol for the most part be offset by slower
gs-owth later on.
Meeting 1.-held on May 17, 1977
Data that had become-available in the days imme-
diately after the April uieeting suggested that over
the April-May period both M-1 and M-2 would
grow at rates well within their specified ranges,
although it appeared that growth in April would be
strong. Accordingly, the Manager of the System
Open Market -kccount sought to maintain the Fed-
eral funds rate at about 4% per cent or a shade
higher. liv late April, ho,wever, incoming olata sug-
gested that over the 2-mo,,tI, period M-1 was likely
to grow at a rate considerably above the upper limit
of its specified range as,d that M-2 was likely to grow
at a rate close to the mioll,onnt of its range. In those
circumstances System operatio,us is’ hate April and
early May were co,nducted with a view to raising the
Federal funds rate to,ward 5¾per cent, the upper
limit of its specified range.
On May 6 the Committee voted to increase the
upper limits o,f the range fo,r the Federal funds rate
frosn 5¾to 5½per cent, with the understanding
that the Manager wouhd use the additional leeway
only if new data becoming available befo,re May 17,
the date for this meeting, suggested tl,at the aggre-
gates were strengthening sigsmflcantly further on bal-
ance. Such, additional streugthi did not develop in
that period, and the Manager continued to am, for a
funds rate of aro,uud ‘5¾ per cent. In the final days
of the period, the rate actually fluctuated between
5¾ amid 5% per cent.
With respect to the economic situation and out-
look, men,bers of the Committee generally were of
the view that the expansion in business activity was
quite strong. In particular, they expected over-all
growth to rea~ainsubstantial for a number of quar-
ters ahead.
The recesit acceleration in the rate of price rise
was a scurce of concern.
At U.S. banks, gro,wtl, in total credit accelerated
during April from th,e already brisk pace of the first
quarter. All major loan categosries expanded signifi-
cantly further, and holdings of tax-exempt securities
increased sisas-phy for the first time since November.
As to) policy for the period ia,mediately ah,ead,
men,bers o,f the Co,snn,ittee thought that relatively
slow growthi iii monetary aggregates over the May-
Juae period would be appropriate in order to com-
pensate at least in part for the exceptionally rapid
gs-oiwthi is, April. In considerissg the ranges o,f growth~
to be specified for the 2-mom,th, period, they took
account o,f a staff a,,ahysis tl,at suggested that the
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to, ha’e raiserh the smoner’ stock sufficiently to accosm-
mo,-date much of tb,e prshhic’s need for additional
trarmsactions h,alances in the seconob quarter and, con-
sequentlv. tl~atmonetary growth was hikelv to he
show.
Most Cos,,mittee n~emb,ersdiol ,,ot wish to~see a
rise in th~eweekly-average Federal fisnds rate above
5% per cem,t during the inter-meeting period — at
heart not with,out further co,nsuhtation In sup-
po,rt of com,straining tb~eupper his,,it to -5¾ per ces~t,
it was suggested that a further rise of 50 to 60 basis
points — roughly the magnitmmde r,f the increasc
since the April meeting — was likely to h,ave more
significant repercussions on financial markets and
that co,nsiderabhe uncertais~tyexisted about the sin-
denying strength of the monetary aggregates.
Meeting Held on June 21. 1977
Throughout the inter-meetiisg period, incoming data
suggested that over th,e May-June period M-i and
M-2 on the average wouhd grow at rates well with,in
the specified ranges. Accordingly, the Manager con-
tinned to aim for a weekly-average funds rate of
abo,ut 5¾per cent, am,d the rate remained chose to
that level during the period.
Staff projections suggested that in the second half of
1977 amid in early 1978 the rate o,f growth in real
CNP would be fairly rapid, ahthough significantly
less so than in the first half of this year. The projec-
tions also suggested th,at the rate of increase imi prices
would moderate frosm th,at in the first h,ahf but would
remain comparativehy high.
It was ahso suggested that confidence has been
enhanced by System policies — specifically, by the
promptness with which open market operations dur-
ing the periosd between the Aprih as,d May sneetings
responded to th,e April surge is’ monetary growth.
Thie magnitude of recent declines in yields on hong-
tem, bonds was cited as partial evidence for this
view.
At U.S. has,ks, growth in to,tah credit showedi som’e-
what in May froiu th,e relatively rapid pace of April,
but th,e rate was close to the average for the
January-Apsil period.
In considering policy for the period insmediatehy
ahead, the n,embers o,f the Comn,ittee to,ok account
of the hkehih,ood that growth in hi-i would ren,ain
relatively show in June — continuing to respond tom
th,e April surge — but that growth fron, the first to,
the second quarter would nevertheless exceed tl,e
Committee’s homsger-rum, range for th,at aggregate. Ism
Juhy, according to staff analysis, expas~sionof hi-i
was likely to be magnified b~’-apurely tech,nicah
factor — namely, distm-ibution of sociah security
checks earhier in the month than usual, thereby
causing demand deposits to be larger than they
othenyise would be over the 3-day weekend includ-
ing Juhy 4.
Most menmb,ers favo,red giving greater weight than
nsssal to mos,ev market condition,s in o onds.scting
open market operations in tl,e nerir,d ns,tih tb,e next
nieeting because of uncertainty ahoust hi-i grov.’th
rates in the near temn~.However, a rm,smber of the
mneml,ers expresseoh a preference for continuing to
b,aye operatis,g ohecisio,ns i,, th~e 1,eniod ah,eaol
b,ased prin~arih o,,, the heb,avior of th~emonetary
aggregates.
Ahmost all mesmhers fayo,red ohireo~ting operations
— at heast initiahhv — toward s,,ointaiuing tb,e Fed-
eral fui,ds rate at about its prevaihing level of
5% per cent.
Meeting Held on July 19, 1977
Throughout the inter-meeting period, incoming data
suggested that over the Jnne-Jnhy periodl M-i ammo’
M-2 wouhol grow at rates within those [tl,eir] ranges.
Accordingly, th,e Manager of the Systemmi Open Mar-
ket Account sought to, mnaim,tais~ th~eFeoleral funds
rate around 5% per cent.
Staff projections stsggested that the mate osf groswthi
in reah CNP iyouhd be hess rapid in the second half
of 1977 than in the first amid that it wo,uhd show
son,ewl,at further into 1978. The projectiomns ahso ssmg—
gesteol that the rate o,f im,crease in prices would
smo,derate fsosss th,at in tue first half hot wo,uhd res,,ain
high.
In their discussio,n of the economic sitosation, ‘acm—
hers of the Co,s,,s,,ittee ags-eeol with time general out-
lines of the staff projectiosms, wl,ich, were describeoh
as presesiting a fairly optimistic picture of pro)spec-
tive developments. Despite thme bmo,aol co’m,se,’sus on
the osstho,o,k, several s,,cmbers suggested thait expan—
nomi in sosne sectomrs of den,as,oh mnigh~tprove to) be
hess stromig than ex1,ected by tl,e staff and that
growth is~s-cal GNP was more hikehy to fall short o,f
tIns, to exceed the pro,jected rates.
At U.S. comn,erciah bas,ks, gmowth, in total credit
slowed somewhat further is, June and was shigh,thy
below the average for th,e first 5 months of th,e year,
T1,e showing iii June s-eflected dec]ines in s,et acoluisi—
tions of Treasury as,ol other securities. Cro,wth, omf reah
estate loans acceherateol to near-record pace, amid
gs’owth of most osther major catego,ries rif loam’s was
substantial.
All i,,embers fa-o’s,s-ed a retursm tom basing decisiom,s
for o,pemr n,arket operations is, the perio,d in,medi—
atehv aheadh pnisnanihy on the beh,as-ior omf thse mom,e—
tory- aggregates. At its n~ectis,gims June thie Co,s,,mit—
tee h,ad ohecioled to giye greater weigh,t than misual
to mnonev n,arket con,ditiom,s in conductis~goperatiomis
ism the peniooi ,mm,tih thus meetim~g.
Alasomst all members fayo,ned directing operatiosus
initialhy toward the osbjective of maintaining time
Federal fsms,ds rate at its current level of 5% per
cem,t, but a few members suggested that operations
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be directed toward achieving a slightly higher rate
within a short time.
Subsequent to the meeting, on August 4, nearly
final estimates indicated that in Jmmly M-1. had grown
at an annuah rate of about 18½per cent and M-2 at
a rate of ahonit 16½per cemut, For the Juhy-Ansgust
period staff projections suggested tb,at the amnmsal
rates o,f growth for bo,th aggregates wo,uhd he well
above the tspper limits of the ranges specified by tl,e
Cosmmittee in the next-to-last paragraph of the
domestic policy directive issued at the July n,eeting.
The Manager of the System Open Market Account
was currently aiming at a funds rate of 5% per cent,
the upper limit of the inter-meeting range specified
in the directive.
Against that background, Chairman Bums recom-
mended on Augssst 4 that the upper limit of the
range for the Federal funds rate be increased tom 6
per cent so th,at the Manager might have some addi-
tional leeway for operations, while continuing to take
account of the current Treasury financing and finan-
cial market developments. He further recommended
that this additional leeway be mssed very gradmmahhy,
and only in the event that the aggregates continued to
register values far beyond the Committee’s objectives.
Meeting Held on August 16, 1977
Data that had beco,me available in the days imsme-
diately following the July meeting smsggested that
over the July-August period both hi-i and M-2
wom,hd grow at rates in the upper parts of their
specified ranges. These data were considered espe-
cially tentative, however, becamsse nsnusmsah patterns
in the figures received jsnst after the power failure in
New Yo,rk City suggested that the faihnmre might have
introduced statistical distortions. Th,e System Ac-
count Manager, therefore, continued to seek a Fed-
eral funds rate of about 5¾ per cent. Later, however,
when new data not o,nly confirmed the initial signs
of strength bmmt also suggested that growth in the
aggregates would be somewhat above the upper
limits of the specified ranges, System opes’ations wes’e
directed at achievim,g ahigher Federal funds rate,
Information that became available on August 4
suggested th,at the growth rates in the aggregates in
the July-Augnst period wotsld be well above the
ranges specified by the Committee, and on August 5
the Committee voted tom increase the upper himit of
the range for the funds rate to 6 per cent, It was
understood that the Manager would use this addi-
tional leeway very graduahly and only in the event
that the aggregates continued to register values far
in excess of the Commmittee’s objectives. When such
strength in the aggregates did persist, the Account
Manager aimed at a Federal funds rate of about
6 per cent.
In the Committee’s discussion of the economic
situation, the snembers agreed that the expansion
was likely to continue for some time.
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Total loans [in Juhy] rose n,ore rapidly than in any
other month since last October, s’efiecting strength in
most major categories.
In crsnsidering policy fomr tl,e period immediately
ahead, members of the Committee nomted that growth
in the monetary aggregates was expected to slow
markedly in Augssst and September. Because of the
sharp increases in July, however, expansion in the
third quarter as a whole — particmmharly in M-1 —
would be relatively rapid. It svas observed that con-
siderably shower growth rates wo,mdd he needed in
subsequesut quarters if monetary grow’th for the year
ending with the second quarter of i978 was to be
kept within the ranges that the Committee had de-
cided upon in July.
While the views of members on appropriate short-
run policy did not differ greatly, a nun,ber of mem-
bers placed particular stress on the need to resist
further sizable increases in the monetary aggregates,
nosting that continued rapid growth would foster in-
flationary expectations and weakening of confidence
within the business community, Other members put
more emphasis on the sizable increase thuat had oc-
curred since hate April in the Federal funds rate and
other short-term interest rates, and sonIc expressed
reluctance to seek further tightening in the money
market at a time when growth in economic activity
was showing signs of moderating. These members
smsggested that, in the absence of unusual behavior in
the monetary aggregates, it wonshd be desirable to)
maintaimi relatively stable conditions in the money
market for the time being.
The members agreed that, in view of the July
bulge in the nuonetar aggregates, no easing of
money market co,nditions should be sought in the
coming interval even if growth rates in the aggre-
gates during the August-September period appeared
to be quite how.
Meeting Field on September 20, 1977
Data that had become available in the weeks
immediately following the August FOMC meeting
suggested that over the August-September period
M-i was growing at a rate in the sipper half and
M-2 at a rate near the midpoint of their respective
ranges. Accordingly, the System Account Manager
continued to seek a Federal fmmnds rate of arosmnd
6 per cent. Near the end of the inter-nueeting period,
growth in M-1 for the 2-month period appeared to
be exceeding the upper limit of its range and growth
in M-2 appeared to be in the upper half of its range.
Therefore, the Manager sought a firming in the Fed-
eral funds rate to around Ø1/~per cent, and the rate
averaged close to that level in the 5 days jnmst prior
to this nueeting of the Co,mmittee.
In the Committee’s discnssiors of the economic
situation and outlook, the members agreed — as
they h,ad at the August meeting — that the expan-
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of tl,emn expected that real GNP wonsld grow at
about the momderate pace projecteoh by tise staff.
Howeves-, somne members expressed dotsbts aho,nst
the vigor omf the expansion.
Concern was expressed about the outlomok for both
nsnemploysnent as,ol prices.. It was remarkeol that
even if real CNP grew at a n,oderate pace over the
next year. little progm’ess woisld he n,aohe in reducing
the unenuplovnuent rate. .. -Moreover, one snember
observed, recent experience had shosvn that high
unemployment did not greatly seduce the rate of
inflation, and the staff projections did suggest per-
sistence of bothu a rapid rate omf isillation assd a }sig}s
rate of nmnemphoyment.
At U.S. commercial banks, growth, iss total credit
accelerated during August to a rate somewl,at abosve
the average for the first 7 mosuths of i977.
In their discussion at this meeting of policy fomr thse
immediate future, Commmittee members diffes-ed in
their views on the apprompriate response to the re-
cent rapid growth in the monetary aggregates. It
was nomted that growth in M-i and M-2 had nomt
slowed so much in August as had been expected and
that it apparenthy syas picking msp somewhat in Sep-
tesnber — making it likely that the rates omf mnonetary
expansion in the third quarter wom.shd be high relative
to the Committee’s longer-run ranges. Son,e men’-
bers thought that the Comn,ittee’s primary objective
in the period imn,ediately ahead should be tom resist
continued rapid expansion in the aggregates, in light
of the implications of such expansion for infiatioms
and inflationary expectatiomns. On the omther hand,
some n,embers advocated avoiding substantial in-
creases in interest sates at present, in light of their
doubts about the econosnic ossthook, It was also ssoted
that the recent ligh rate of gromwths imi hi-i snight
represent a return tom a snomre typical relatiomiship
hehyeen that rate and tlse growth rate in nominal
GNP — fomhhomwing a period is, wisich the dlemaas,ol for
money had been held doswn by changes in financial
practices — and accordimsghv th~atit might not war-
rant the kind omf policy s’espoase timat wosmld he ap-
propriate under omther circmsmstances. Most men,bers.
however, were of the opinioms ti,at tI,e Comnsmittee
could not afford to ignore eithser the uncertainties in
a generally favorable ecomnomic outhomomk or the recent
high rates of momnetary growth, and the~’favored
finding some middle ground.
Meeting Field on October 17-18, 1977
In accordance with the Comnsittee’s decision, the
Manager of the System,, Open Market Acco,msnt began
immediately after the September meetissg tom seek
bank reserve conditions consistent with a Federal
fisnols rate of aromss,d 6¾per cem~t,Data that were
becoming available at the same time suggested that
over the September-October period hi-i and M-2
wonmhOl grow at rates at or ahomve th,e Tipper himits of
the ranges specified by the Committee, amid tue esti-
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mnates omf these gromwth rates were raised further on
the l,asis of the ohata that became available in sub-
seqmsent weeks, Tl,em-efo,re, the Manager sosmght a
gradmsah finning in thue Fecheral funds rate to 6½per
ces,t, the smpper hin,it of its specifleoi range.
Isu the Cosnsnittee’s discussion of the economic
situatioms. tlse members agreedh that th,e expansion in
activity \\‘as likely tom coss,tinue fomr some time to comme.
Tl,ey’ ohiffereol, however, in their assessments omf thue
promspective vigor omf the expansion.
Uncertaim,ty was expresseol about time nsnderhving
cas,ses o,f the expansiomi of the ohes,,as,d for money
(narromwlv defls,ed) in the secomnd and third quarters
and about the implications omf that expansiom, for
pohicv. It was suggested th,at variomnms changes ims
financial technology that haoh been resulting in smsb-
stitutios, of incomn,e-earning deposits for demand de-
posits had hecomn,e less pomwerfuh andl, com,seqssently,
that increasing demnands for transactions halas,ces is~
the latest two quarters h,aol 1,ad a greater effect on
growths in hi—i. Os~emneinslmer suggested that the
demas,ol fomr momsey h~ad ahsom imeen raisedh recem,tly by
increased1 osmucertairmty omf varionss kinds — abomnst con-
ditions in the job snarket, abo,mst prices of securities,
about foreigu exchamsge rates, as,d ahmomst other ele-
ments in the ecosnommic situatios~— and tI,at thus had
contrihsmteoh tom thue apparent olechis~e is) the incomme
velomcity of hi-i is~the third quarter. In his view,
however, the oiechis,e in vehomcity n,omre fm.ss~d1amentalh
reflecteoi tlse shsiggishssmess omf ecos,omic expansion in
th~ethirdh qnsarter, and a pick-nsp is, the pace of ex—
pansiom~ once again nuight be accosnpanieoi lmv a
sh~arprise in velomcit.
Because of the sss,certaim,tv almout the nss~derhying
causes omf the recent expansiomsl is, tl,e olemas,d fomr
Ni—i and abosst the pi-ospects for its velocity, somme
men,lmers inohicated th,at they m,ow h,ad less confi-
oles,ce in the hel,avio,r omf tlse sssomm,etarv aggregates
as gnmides to n,oms,etary pom1i~’vthan tl,ey snighut hsave
had earlier, It ‘yas felt, n,omreover, tlsat tI,ose um~cer-
tainties made it particuharhy imapomrtasst tom emphasize
tl~atthe Co,n,mittee’s l,asic gomal was to coms,trihute tom
thue satisfactory perfomrmamuce of the ecos~osmyrather
tisas~ to, pursnse pre—oheternsineoh rates of roonetarv
growth~.
At U.S. coms,,s,,ercial banks, gromwth is’ total credit
was sn,ahl in Septemhmer fomllowing ssshmstantiah expasu-
siomn in the precedimsg 2 nsonths.
A.s to podicy- fomr the periomd imnmediateh- ah,ead,
i,,embers omf time Comsns,,ittee were is~relatively- clomse
agreen,es,t with, respect tom th~eir preferences fomr
ranges omf growth fosr tb,e monetary aggregates omvcr
the October-Noven,ber period.
The s,,esi,lmers were agreed tl,at little omr no, decline is,
the Feoleral ftsssols rate shuommshdi be cos~tesnplateol
osnder fosrcsccahhc circumsmstances, but views were
ohividhed with respect to the nsplmer his,,it tl,at shmomuld
be set fomr the rate ..
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Meeting Field on November 15, 1977
Isnmediatehy following the [October] meeting. ins-
commisug ohata huad suggested tl,at omver the Octomlmer—
Noyen,lmer pes-iomd M—i as,d M—2 wonshol gnmmw at rates
witl,is, their specified ras~ges coms-ohinglv, the Man-
ager omf the Sy-stess, Olmd’ms Market Accmmns,t sosmsgh,t tom
maintais, the Federal fmss,ohs rate at aro sssmol 6½per
cent. In hsste Octomber, horn-ever. aohdhitioms,al dhata sisg—
gested thsat NI-i and hi-2 were gromwing at rates
appromachiog omr sno\’ing bevomnd the upper hin,its mmf
their rammges. Tlmerefosre. the hianager sosught a slight
firn,is,g in the fus,ohs rate. Still later, available ohata
agais) suggesteoh tb,at growth, is~ bosth aggregates
would bme withim, tl,e rangen h,es,o’e time hias,aaer’s
othjective for the funds rate was returs,ed tom 6½per
cent.
Staff promjections snggesteoh thmat gronvth is~real CNP
womuloh comsmtiosme at a snodherate, ahthoms.sgh, graohuallv
din~isisb~img, pace thss-o,ssg},omut 1978. It was alsom cx—
pecteoi that the rate omf increase in prices wouhol
ren,ain high.
isu the Committee’s ohiscussion of the ecomoomn,ic sit—
uatim,n. the meobers agreed that th,e staff projections
— ss,ggestis~gthmat gromwthu is~real CNP would cost,-
tinsse at a n,mmderate, ahthomssgb, gradualhy ohimis~ishing.
pace tl~rosmsghommst 1978 — ivcre reasomm,ah,le. Th,ere
were. hoswcves’. sommne sb,aohings omf \-iew almo,tst pr’s—
pects fomr the econos,,v.
It was s,o,ted during tl,e discussion that. accomrohing
tom projections omf th~eFederal budhget on a “high~
emplovsnent” basis, fiscal poshicv womulol n~om\-efrs,n, a
huighlv stimulative stam,ce ims th,e secom,d half omf 1977
to, approximate nemstrahitv by the essoh of 1978, unhess
somsne new’ fiscal is,itiatives were undertakes,.
At U.S. commnmnerciah lmam,ks, growth in total credit
acceleratcol in Octomber froam, the relativchv slomw pace
recomrdeoh in Sclmtenuhmer. The pick—up reihecteol a
\‘igomrous expansion in Imam,k lenohisig Lh,at w~ssosffset
only irs part lmv a fssrther reoluctismss ii, holdings omf
Treasury s oecus-i tiow -
Is, the chiscssssion, of pohiox- fo,r tl,e 1,eriomd io,s~ueohi—
atelv al,ead, s,,cn,hers nosted th,at growth, in the
mos~etaryaggregates appeareoh to he shomwissg sharply
in Noven,ber. It was observed th,at fomr a sosn,her omf
reasomss growth, rates fomr Decen,Imer were particsslarly
difficult tom project, hut eves, if the)- alsom 1mrsmved tom
hme bmw, twos cossseo:istive sxsos,th,s osf shomw growth
womnhd heac ceptabhe is, \-iew omf tl,e rapid s,,omnetarv
expaosioms omf recem~tmoms,tl,s. The coss,,snesst was n,ade
that time sharp shoswiog in early Non-esisbmer suggested
fl,at the aggregates o,igl~tgrow at reasomssahmhy satis-
factory rates over thc Noves,mber-Decesm,lmcr period,
assuming comntismuatioms~ smf a Feoheral fu,,ohs rate at
abomut its curs’esit level. hiany soesnimers is,diyated
that tImex- would like to ms,aiatais, stable coms,dhitioms,5 is,
tl,e mos,ey n,arket fomr a tis,,e and tb,at ti,ev were
willing to accept a rate of gromwtl, in hi—i omyer th~e
N’ovem,,ber~Deceis,imer pesiomol withis, a sosmewhmat
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wider range than usual, encompassing relatively how
growth.
Most snesnl,ers expressed a preferessce for cosn-
tis~mus~g to, give greater weigist tl~as,msstsal tom n,osnev
ss,arket coms,ohitiom,s in o-omm,ohucting opes~mm,arket olmera—
tions in th,e pem’iomol m,til the next meeting osf the
Comi,,s,,ittee. However, a ,,sssnber omf n~es,~imes-s u-es-c in
favomr of Imasisig osperating oiecisions primarilx- oss, the
lmel,aviomr omf time snoms,etarv aggregates.
Meeting Field on December 19-20, 1977
Thromisgimomsst tIme pes-iool bmetween the Non-ember
as,d Deceo,l,er ameetii,gs, incomming data smsggestedi
that gromwtl, is’ hi—i anol hI—2 womuloh hmc well within
the rammges that lmaoh hmeem, speo-iflech by the Comsmnit-
tee. Accosrdingh-, the hianages’ o,f the System Open
Market Accomtss,t somssgi~t tom snais,tain reserve comndli—
tions comnsistes,t witlm a Feoherah fns~dsrate of 6½ per
cent.
Staff projectiomas fomr the year ah,eaoh, which were
hasedi os~assumptismns th,at did smot is,cluohe reductions
in Ferleral isId-Osne taxes, differed little from,, tl,omse
prepared just hefomrc time Noves,,hmer meeting osf tbme
Connmittee~ th,ev stsggesteol th,at real CNF wommboi
continsse tom gromw at a s,,o,derate, ahthosugl, graduai~-
ohisninishim~g, pace throsughomsst 1978. It was -ahssm ex-
pected that th~erate of increase in prices \voosloh re-
maim, high sind th,at thme unemploymes~t rate would
T
decline gradually.
Is~the Committee’s discssssioss, omf the ecomnomsnic
sitisatioms,, the s,,es,,lmers were in agrecmnent tl,at the
expansiomm, is, activit\- was hikch- tom o’omntimase ti,romugbu—
oust the year al,ead. A smtssnher smf mm,es,,hmers expressed
the view tlmat gromw-tl, is, real CNP olsss-is~g1978 womuloh
he as stromsg as omr strossger tl,an that suggested Imy
tb,e stall projectiomns. Other mesnl,ers fosresaw susim—
st~ss,tiahstrcs,gth, fomr tIme periosoh in,n,eohiateiv ah,eadl
— in respom~se tom the reces,t pick—up is~final sales and
coms,seo1sses~taohjustn~es,tcmf ismves,tor’,- pomsitiomns — but
less stres,gthm hater is, 1978. It was ssomtedl. homxyes-er,
that the ads,,is,istratioms, was plans~im~g to propomse a
substantial reduction is, taxes os’ is,ohividual asmol bsmsi—
s’ess imscoms,,es is, the s,ew ‘-ear, as,d tl,~stsuch~redssc—
tioss,s — o1epensdis~gsspomm~tlseir natssre and timsming —
could have a significsss~t efl’ect on the comsmrse omf
activity.
- it was alsom omhmscrved that esslargeol deficits is~time
Federal budget n~igl~ t hme accos,,pasmieoh hmv is,creases
is, interest rates as th,e year progressed. It was sosg—
gestedh, s~momreo’-cr, ti,at the rate of inflation coosid
promve to be hmighes tharm expected as,d comuhdh, there-
fomre, hamnper the promgress of the expisnsiomss.
Is, the Coms,,mittee’s discussioms,, serirmus cosmcersm was
expressed ahmosmt the reces,t weakm,ess of thme ohsmhhar issm
foreigs~excbsasmge s,,arkets. \Vh,ihe it was s,oted thmat
oleoreciatiomss of th,e ohomihar mmmigl,t is’ tisne coss,trihmsste
tom is,,prosvess,es,t is, the U.S. trade baias,ce, it was
pomis,ted omut tlmat it com,trihmssted tim the rate of inflatioms,FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOWS MARCH 1978
in this comnntrv asmd weakened imtssiness confidence
both here and aimroad. Excessi’e appreciatiomn omf frmr—
eigs~currencies, it was ssmggested, could have ad-
verse effects om’ over-all ecomnimsssic activity aimromad
and, cos,sequentlv, osm the U.S. trarhe hmalam,ce. The
ombservation wm,s n,aohe th~atthe positiosm osf the oioshlar
would be strengthmessed imvadoptioo is’ timis cosnsmtrv
of an effective energy promgrism, of a tax policy con-
dtscive tim imissiness investmm~es,ti,ere, as,oh of a mosre
effective attack on is,fhatioms,, as well as by pursuit
ahrsmad of faster rates of ecosnomsnic gromwtlm.
At U.S. commercial banks, expansismn omf tomtal credit
in Novemimer was close to tIme fast pace is, October.
Bank lomans cosstis,ued to gromw at a rapioh rate, as~rh
the strength was broadly- distriimssted asmmrmsmg nmajor
loan categories.
Is, the Committee’s discussion of pomlicy fmmr time
period imn,cdiatehv aimeadl, tue mes,,bems tomok s,imtc
of the slowdomwn is, tIme grommvth of the nnrms,etary ag-
gregates in recesmt ,veeks’ -as,d of the usmcertais,ties is,
financial markets ussmaliy- associated with, time year-
end. Agaisist that lmackgrossnd and iss light of time
perfos-mance of the econrmmy, it was observed tl,at
increases in short-tern, interest rates were probably
aomt warranterl ~stthis tii,,e. Omm tl,e omtimer hmanrl, it was
suggested, th,e weaksmess of the doshhar is’ fomm-eiga ex-
change markets argueoh against deciisses in suds
rates.Ao’cordismgiv, s,most smmes,mhmers ‘yes-c is, fayo,r of
time s,maismtenamsce i,f 15revaihing coms,olitiom,s is) time
snonev mas-ket fomr the tisi,c lmeismg asmd osf cosmtirnsing
to, give greater weigimt ti,an sssoai tsm 50051ev rn~,rket
conrhitiomns is, comsmohsscting opesm smmas-ket omlmeratiomsms is,
the period sss,til time smext ssseetissg omf tlme Conmsnittee.
However, sonme smmenmlmers im,ohicated a preference fomr
imasismg operatismg decisimmmms is, the perismoI aimead pri—
manic on the lmeh,avioms’ omf time smmosmetarv aggregates.
The Cos,mnmittee decided to is,ciude iss time mmext to
last paragrapim o,f its directix-e to time Federal Reserve
Bank of New York the fimhhomwing sesmtes,ce: “lit time
condluct of day-to-day- omperatiosms, account simail be
taken omf esmmergismg fismancial smmarket cossditiomss. is,-
cludimsg time unsettled eomssoiitioms,s iss foseigs, exclmasmge
snarkets.” Th,is is,structiomsi was ~,dded tom provide time
hiaaager witim sosnewimat greater fiexilmihity-, is, part
because omf the Co,snn,ittee’s view thmat presstsres isa
the dohlar is, foreign excimasmge smmarkets smmight appro-
priatel)- is,fluence time smisture amid tismmissg ssf dosm,estic
open sm,arket operations fron, day to day.
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